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The scenario approach meets uncertain variational inequalities and
game theory
Dario Paccagnan and Marco C. Campi
Abstract—Variational inequalities are modelling tools used
to capture a variety of decision-making problems arising in
mathematical optimization, operations research, game theory.
The scenario approach is a set of techniques developed to
tackle stochastic optimization problems, take decisions based
on historical data, and quantify their risk. The overarching
goal of this manuscript is to bridge these two areas of research,
and thus broaden the class of problems amenable to be studied
under the lens of the scenario approach. First and foremost, we
provide out-of-samples feasibility guarantees for the solution of
variational and quasi variational inequality problems. Second,
we apply these results to two classes of uncertain games. In the
first class, the uncertainty enters in the constraint sets, while
in the second class the uncertainty enters in the cost functions.
Finally, we exemplify the quality and relevance of our bounds
through numerical simulations on a demand-response model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Variational inequalities are a very rich class of decision-
making problems. They can be used, for example, to charac-
terize the solution of a convex optimization program, or to
capture the notion of saddle point in a min-max problem.
Variational inequalities can also be employed to describe
complementarity conditions, nonlinear systems of equations,
or equilibrium notions such as that of Nash or Wardrop equi-
librium [1]. With respect to the applications, variational in-
equalities have been employed in countless fields, including
transportation networks, demand-response markets, option
pricing, structural analysis, evolutionary biology [2]–[6].
Many of these settings feature a non-negligible source
of uncertainty, so that any planned action inevitably comes
with a degree of risk. While deterministic models have been
widely used as a first order approximation, the increasing
availability of raw data motivates the development of data-
based techniques for decision-making problems, amongst
which variational inequalities are an important class. As
a concrete example, consider that of drivers moving on a
road traffic network with the objective of reaching their
destination as swiftly as possible. Based on historical data,
a given user would like to i) plan her route, and ii) estimate
how likely she is to reach the destination within a given time.
Towards this goal, it is natural to consider variational
inequalities where the solution is required to be robust
against a set of observed realizations of the uncertainty, as
formalized next. Given a collection of sets {Xδi}
N
i=1, where
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{δi}
N
i=1 are independent observations from the probability
space (∆,F ,P), and given F : Rn → Rn, we consider the
following variational inequality problem:
find x⋆ ∈ X
.
=
N⋂
i=1
Xδi s.t. F (x
⋆)⊤(x−x⋆) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X .
(1)
We assume no information is available on P, and ask the
following fundamental question: how likely is a solution of
(1) to be robust against unseen realizations?
In this respect, our main objective is to provide proba-
bilistic bounds on the feasibility of a solution to (1), while
ensuring that such solution can be computed using a tractable
algorithm. While our results are de facto probabilistic feasi-
bility statements, we will show how to apply them to game
theoretic models to e.g., quantify the probability of incurring
a higher cost compared to what originally predicted.1
Related works. Two formulations are typically employed
to incorporate uncertainty into variational inequality models
[7]. A first approach, termed expected-value formulation,
captures uncertainty arising in the corresponding operator F
in an average sense. Given X ⊆ Rn, F : X×∆→ Rn, and a
probability space (∆,F ,P), a solution to the expected-value
variational inequality is an element x⋆ ∈ X such that
E[F (x⋆, δ)]⊤(x − x⋆) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X . (2)
Naturally, if the expectation can be easily evaluated, solving
(2) is no harder than solving a deterministic variational
inequality, for which much is known (e.g., existence and
uniqueness results, algorithms [1]). If this is not the case,
one could employ sampling-based algorithms to compute an
approximate solution of (2), see [8]–[10].
A second approach, which we refer to as the robust
formulation, is used to accommodate uncertainty both in the
operator, and in the constraint sets. Consider the collection
{Xδ}δ∈∆, where Xδ ⊆ Rn, and let X
.
= ∩δ∈∆Xδ . A solution
to the robust variational inequality is an element x⋆ ∈ X s.t.
F (x⋆, δ)⊤(x− x⋆) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X , ∀δ ∈ ∆. (3)
It is worth noting that, even when the uncertainty enters only
in F , a solution to (3) is unlikely to exists.2 The above
requirement is hence weakened employing a formulation
1This is the main reason to extend the results derived for (1) to the richer
class of quasi variational inequality problems, see Sections III-A and IV.
2To understand this, consider the case when the variational inequality is
used to describe the first order condition of a convex optimization program.
Within this setting, (3) requires x⋆ to solve a family of different optimization
problems, one per each δ ∈ ∆. Thus, (3) only exceptionally has a solution.
termed expected residual minimization (ERM), see [11].
Within this setting, given a probability space (∆,F ,P), a
solution is defined as x⋆ ∈ argminx∈X E[Φ(x, δ)], where
Φ : X ×∆→ R is a residual function.3 In other words, we
look for a point that satisfies (3) as best we can (measured
through Φ), on average over ∆. Sample-based algorithms for
its approximate solution are derived in, e.g., [12], [13].
While the subject of our studies, defined in (1), differs
in form and spirit from that of (2), it can be regarded as
connected to (3). Indeed, our model can be thought of as a
sampled version of (3), where the uncertainty enters only in
the constraints. In spite of that, our objectives significantly
depart from that of the ERM formulation, as detailed next.
Contributions. The goal of this manuscript is that of quanti-
fying the risk associated with a solution of (1) against unseen
samples δ ∈ ∆, while ensuring that such solution can be
computed tractably. Our main contributions are as follows.
i) We provide a-priori and a-posteriori bounds on the
probability that the solution of (1) remains feasible for
unseen values of δ ∈ ∆ (out-of-sample guarantees).
ii) We show that the bounds derived in i) hold for the
broader class of quasi variational inequality problems.
iii) We leverage the bounds obtained in i) to study Nash
equilibrium problems with uncertain constraint sets.
iv) We employ the bounds derived in ii) to give concrete
probabilistic guarantees on the performance of Nash
equilibria, relative to games with uncertain payoffs, as
originally defined by Aghassi and Bertsimas in [14].
v) We consider a simple demand-response scheme and
exemplify the applicability and quality of our proba-
bilistic bounds through numerical simulations.
Our results follow the same spirit of those derived within
the so-called scenario approach, where the sampled coun-
terpart of a robust optimization program is considered, and
the risk associated to the corresponding solution is bounded
in a probabilistic sense [15]–[21]. To the best of the au-
thors’ knowledge, our contribution is the first to enlarge
the applicability of the scenario approach to the broader
class of variational inequality problems. While variational
inequalities are used to model a wide spectrum of problems,
we limit ourselves to discuss the impact of our results on the
class of uncertain games, due to space considerations.
Organization. In Section II we introduce the main subject of
our analysis, as well as some preliminary notions. Section III
contains the main result and its extension to quasi variational
inequalities. In Section IV we show the relevance of the
bounds previously derived in connection to uncertain games.
In Section V we test our results on a demand-response
scheme through exhaustive numerical simulations.
II. THE SCENARIO APPROACH TO VARIATIONAL
INEQUALITIES
Motivated by the previous discussion, in the remainder
of this paper we consider the variational inequality (VI)
3A function Φ : X × ∆ → R is a residual function if, Φ(x, δ) = 0
whenever x is a solution of (3) for given δ, and Φ(x, δ) > 0 elsewhere.
introduced in (1) and reported in the following:
find x⋆ ∈ X
.
=
N⋂
i=1
Xδi s.t. F (x
⋆)⊤(x−x⋆) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X ,
where F : Rn → Rn and Xδi ⊆ R
n for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
are elements of a family of sets {Xδ}δ∈∆. Throughout
the presentation we assume that {δi}Ni=1 are independent
samples from the probability space (∆,F ,P), though no
knowledge is assumed on P. In order to provide out-of-
sample guarantees on the feasibility of a solution to (1), we
begin by introducing two concepts that play a key role: the
notion of risk and that of support constraint.
Definition 1 (Risk). The risk of a given x ∈ X is given by
V (x)
.
= P{δ ∈ ∆ s.t. x /∈ Xδ}.
The quantity V (x) measures the violation of the constraints
defined by x ∈ Xδ for all δ ∈ ∆. As such, V : X →
[0, 1] and, for fixed x, it constitutes a deterministic quantity.
Nevertheless, since x⋆ is a random variable (through its
dependance on (δ1, . . . , δN )), the risk V (x
⋆) associated with
the solution x⋆ is also a random variable.4 Our objective will
be that of acquiring deeper insight into its distribution.
Standing Assumption (Existence and uniqueness). For any
N and for any tuple (δ1, . . . , δN), the variational inequality
(1) admits a unique solution identified with x⋆.
Throughout the manuscript, we assume that the Standing
Assumption is satisfied, so that x⋆ is well defined and
unique. It is worth noting that the existence of a solution
to (1) is guaranteed under very mild conditions on the
operator F and on the constraints set X . Uniqueness of x⋆
is instead obtained under structural assumptions on F (e.g.,
strong monotonicity). While these cases do not encompass
all possible variational inequalities arising from (1), the set-
up is truly rich and includes important applications such as
traffic dispatch [2], cognitive radio systems [22], demand-
response markets [3], and many more. Sufficient conditions
guaranteeing the satisfaction of the Standing Assumption are
presented in Proposition 1, included at the end of this section.
Definition 2 (Support constraint). A constraint x ∈ Xδi is of
support for (1), if its removal modifies the solution x⋆. We de-
note with S⋆ the set of support constraints associated to x⋆.
x1
x2
feasible region
δ2
δ3
δ1
x⋆
F (x⋆)
Fig. 1. An example of variational inequality (1) in dimension two. Each
sample in {δi}3i=1 defines a feasible region, and the grey area describes the
set X . Note that x⋆ is a solution of (1) as x⋆ ∈ X , and the inner product
between F (x⋆) with any feasible direction at x⋆ is non-negative. Finally,
observe that δ1 defines a support constraint, while δ2 or δ3 do not.
4We assume measurability of all the quantities introduced in this paper.
Within the example depicted in Figure 1, it is worth noting
that the removal of the constraints Xδ2 or Xδ3 - one at a
time - does not modify the solution: indeed neither Xδ2 , nor
Xδ3 are support constraints. Nevertheless, the simultaneous
removal of both Xδ2 and Xδ3 does change the solution. To
rule out degenerate conditions such as this, we introduce the
following assumption, adapted from [21, Ass. 2].5
Assumption 1 (Non-degeneracy). The solution x⋆ coincides
P
N almost-surely with the solution obtained by eliminating
all the constraints that are not of support.
We conclude this section providing sufficient conditions
that guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the solution
to (1), so that the Standing Assumption holds.
Proposition 1 (Existence and uniqueness, [1]).
- If X is nonempty compact convex, and F is continuous,
then the solution set of (1) is nonempty and compact.
- If X is nonempty closed convex, and F is strongly
monotone on X , then (1) admits a unique solution.6
If (1) is used to characterize the solution of a strongly convex
and smooth optimization program (i.e. if F (x) = ∇xJ(x)
for a smooth J : X → R), the previous proposition applies
directly since the gradient of a strongly convex function is
strongly monotone [23, Prop. 17.10].
III. MAIN RESULT: PROBABILISTIC FEASIBILITY FOR
VARIATIONAL INEQUALITIES
The aim of this section is to provide bounds on the risk as-
sociated to the solution of (1) that hold with high confidence.
Towards this goal, we introduce the map t : N→ [0, 1].
Definition 3. Given β ∈ (0, 1), for any k ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}
consider the polynomial equation in the unknown t
β
N + 1
N∑
l=k
(
l
k
)
tl−k −
(
N
k
)
tN−k = 0. (4)
Let t(k) be its unique solution in the interval (0, 1).7 Further,
let t(k) = 0 for any k ≥ N .
As shown in recent results on scenario optimization [21], the
distribution of the risk V (x⋆) is intimately connected with
the number of support constraints at the solution x⋆, which
we identify with s⋆ = |S⋆|. Given a confidence parameter
β ∈ (0, 1), our goal is to determine a function ε(s⋆) so that
P
N [V (x⋆) ≤ ε(s⋆)] ≥ 1− β
5If {Xδi}
N
i=1 are convex, the degenerate instances constitute exceptional
situations in that they require the constraints to accumulate precisely at the
solution x⋆, as in Figure 1. On the contrary, in the case of non-convex
constraint sets, degenerate cases are much more common, see [21, Sec. 8].
6An operator F : X → Rn is strongly monotone on X if there exists
α > 0 such that (F (x)−F (y))⊤(x−y) ≥ α||x−y||2 for all x, y ∈ X . If
F is continuously differentiable, a sufficient (and easily checkable) condition
amounts to requiring the Jacobian of F to be uniformly positive definite,
that is y⊤JF (x)y ≥ α||y||2 for all y ∈ Rn for all x ∈ X o, where X o is
an open superset of X , see [1, Prop. 2.3.2].
7Existence and uniqueness of the solution to the polynomial equation (4)
is shown in [21, Thm. 2].
holds true for any variational inequality (1) satisfying the
Standing Assumption and Assumption 1. Theorem 1 provides
one way to construct ε(s⋆) by means of t(s⋆).
Theorem 1 (Probabilistic feasibility for VI). Given β ∈
(0, 1), consider t : N→ R as per Definition 3.
(i) Under the Standing Assumption, and Assumption 1, for
any ∆ and P it holds that
P
N [V (x⋆) ≤ ε(s⋆)] ≥ 1−β with ε(s⋆)
.
= 1− t(s⋆),
(5)
(ii) If, in addition, the constraint sets {Xδi}
N
i=1 are convex,
then s⋆ ≤ n (dimension of the decision variable x), and
the following a-priori bound holds for all ∆ and P
P
N [V (x⋆) ≤ ε(n)] ≥ 1− β with ε(n)
.
= 1− t(n).
Proof. The proof is deferred to the Appendix.
The first statement in Theorem 1 provides an a-posteriori
bound, and requires no additional assumption other than the
Standing Assumption and Assumption 1 (e.g., no convexity
of the constraint sets is required). In practice, one computes
a solution to (1), determines s⋆, and is then given a prob-
abilistic feasibility statement for any choice of β ∈ (0, 1).8
In this respect, we are typically interested in selecting β
very small (e.g., 10−6) so that the statement V (x⋆) ≤ ε(s⋆)
holds with very high confidence (e.g., 1−10−6 = 0.999999).
Upon assuming convexity of the constraints sets, the second
statement provides an a-priori bound of the form (5) where
s⋆ is replaced by n (the dimension of the decision variable).
Overall, Theorem 1 shows that the upper bound on the risk
derived in [21, Thm. 4] is not limited to optimization pro-
grams, but holds for the far more general class of variational
inequality problems. For a plot of ε(k), see [21, Fig. 3].
Computational aspects. While Theorem 1 provides certifi-
cates of probabilistic feasibility, its result is of practical in-
terest especially if it is possible to determine a solution of (1)
efficiently. With respect to the computational aspects, much is
known for the class of monotone variational inequalities, i.e.
those variational inequalities where the operator F is mono-
tone or strongly monotone (see footnote 6 for a definition).
Examples of efficient algorithms for strongly monotone and
monotone variational inequalities include projection meth-
ods, proximal methods, splitting and interior point methods.9
On the contrary, if the operator associated to (1) is not
monotone, the problem is intractable to solve in the worst-
case. Indeed, non-monotone variational inequalities hold
non-monotone linear complementarity problems as a special
case. The latter class is known to be NP-complete [24].
A. Extension to quasi variational inequalities
In this section we show how the results of Theorem 1 carry
over to the case when (1) is replaced by a more general class
of problems known as quasi variational inequality (QVI).
8Computing the number of support constraints can be easily achieved by
solving the original problem where constraints are removed one at a time.
9We redirect the reader to [1, Chap. 12] for an extensive treatment.
Informally, quasi variational inequalities extend the notion of
variational inequality by allowing the decision set X to be
parametrized by x, see [25]. QVIs are important tools used
to model complex equilibrium problems arising in various
fields such as games with shared constraints, transportation
network, solid mechanics, biology, and many more [26]–[30].
As we shall see in Section IV, this generalization will be
used to provide concrete performance guarantees for robust
Nash equilibrium problems, whenever the uncertainty enters
in the agents’ cost functions. Let Xδi : R
n
⇒ 2R
n
be
elements of a collection of set-valued maps {Xδ}δ∈∆, for
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Given F : Rn → Rn, we consider the
following quasi variational inequality problem: find x⋆ ∈
X (x⋆)
.
= ∩Ni=1Xδi(x
⋆) such that
F (x⋆)⊤(x− x⋆) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X (x⋆). (6)
Once more, we assume that {δi}
N
i=1 are independent samples
from the probability space (∆,F ,P). Additionally, we as-
sume that (6) admits a unique solution. The notion of support
constraint carries over unchanged from Definition 2, while
the notion of risk requires a minor adaptation.
Definition 4 (Risk for QVI). The risk associated to x is
V (x)
.
= P{δ ∈ ∆ s.t. x /∈ Xδ(x)}
The next theorem shows that the main result presented in
Theorem 1 extends to quasi variational inequalities.
Theorem 2 (Probabilistic feasibility for QVI). Let x⋆ be the
(unique) solution of (6) and s⋆ be the number of support
constraints. Let Assumption 1 hold. Given β ∈ (0, 1), let
t : N→ R be as per Definition 3. Then, for any ∆, P, it is
P
N [V (x⋆) ≤ ε(s⋆)] ≥ 1− β where ε(s⋆)
.
= 1− t(s⋆).
(7)
If, in addition, the sets {Xδi(x
⋆)}Ni=1 are convex, then s
⋆ ≤ n
and the bound (7) holds a-priori with n in place of s⋆.
Proof. The proof is omitted, due to space considerations.
Nevertheless, it is possible to follow (mutatis mutandis) the
derivation presented in the proof of Theorem 1.
IV. APPLICATION TO ROBUST GAME THEORY
A. Uncertainty entering in the constraint sets
We begin by considering a general game-theoretic model,
where agents aim to minimize private cost functions, while
satisfying uncertain local constraints robustly. Formally, each
agent j ∈M = {1, . . . ,M} is allowed to select xj ∈ X j
.
=
∩Ni=1X
j
δi
⊆ Rm, where {X jδi}
N
i=1 is a collection of sets from
the family {X jδ }δ∈∆, and {δi}
N
i=1 are independent samples
from the probability space (∆,F ,P). Agent j ∈M aims at
minimizing the cost function Jj : X j → R. To ease the
notation, we define x−j = (x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xM ),
for any j ∈M. We consider the notion of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 5 (Nash equilibrium). A tuple xNE =
(x1NE, . . . , x
M
NE) is a Nash equilibrium if xNE ∈ X
1 × · · · ×
XM and Jj(xjNE, x
−j
NE) ≤ J
j(xj , x−jNE) for all deviations
xj ∈ X j and for all agents j ∈M.
Assumption 2. For all j ∈ M, the cost function Jj is
continuously differentiable, and convex in xj for any fixed
x−j . The sets {X j}Mj=1 are non-empty, closed, convex for
every tuple (δ1, . . . , δN), for every N .
The next proposition, adapted from [1] draws the key con-
nection between Nash equilibria and variational inequalities.
Proposition 2 (Nash equilibria and VI [1, Prop. 1.4.2]). Let
Assumption 2 hold. Then a point xNE is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if it solves (1), with
F (x)
.
=


∇x1J
1(x)
...
∇xMJ
M (x)

 , Xδi .= X 1δi × · · · × XMδi . (8)
Proof. The proof is reported in the Appendix.
Within the previous model, the uncertainty described by
δ ∈ ∆ is meant as shared among the agents. This is indeed
the most common and challenging situation. In spite of that,
our model also includes the case of non-shared uncertainty,
i.e. the case where X jδ is of the form X
j
δj
as δ can represent
a vector of uncertainty. Limitedly to the latter case, it is pos-
sible to derive probabilistic guarantees on each agent’s fea-
sibility by direct application of the scenario approach [16] to
each agent optimization xjNE ∈ argminxj∈X j J
j(xj , x−jNE) ,
after having fixed x−j = x−jNE. Nevertheless, for the case of
shared uncertainty, a direct application of [21] provides no
answer.10 Instead, the following corollary offers probabilistic
feasibility guarantees for xNE. In this context, a constraint is
of support for the Nash equilibrium problem, if its removal
changes the solution.
Corollary 1 (Probabilistic feasibility for xNE).
- Let Assumption 2 hold. Then, a Nash equilibrium exists.
- Further assume that the operator F defined in (8) is
strongly monotone. Then, xNE is unique.
- Fix β ∈ (0, 1), and let t : N → R be as per Definition
3. In addition to the previous assumptions, assume
that xNE coincides P
N almost-surely with the Nash
equilibrium of a game obtained by eliminating all the
constraints that are not of support. Then, the following
a-posteriori and a-priori bounds hold for any ∆ and P
P
N [V (xNE) ≤ ε(s
⋆)] ≥ 1− β with ε(s⋆)
.
= 1− t(s⋆),
P
N [V (xNE) ≤ ε(n)] ≥ 1− β with ε(n)
.
= 1− t(n),
where n is the dimension of the decision variable x,
and s⋆ is the number support constraints of xNE.
Proof. See the Appendix.
A consequence of Corollary 1 is the possibility to bound the
infeasibility risk associated to any agent j ∈ M. Indeed, let
V j(x)
.
= P{δ ∈ ∆ s.t. xj /∈ X j}. Since V j(x) ≤ V (x),
Corollary 1 ensures that PN [V j(xNE) ≤ ε(s⋆)] ≥ 1− β.
10To see this, observe that a constraint that is not of support for agent’s j
optimization program with fixed x−j = x−j
NE
, might instead be of support
for the Nash equilibrium problem, as its removal could modify x
−j
NE
, which
in turn modifies x
j
NE
.
B. Uncertainty entering in the cost functions
We consider a game-theoretic model where the cost
function associated to each agent depends on an uncertain
parameter. Within this setting, we first revisit the notion of
robust equilibrium introduced in [14]. Our goal is to exploit
the results of Section III and bound the probability that an
agent will incur a higher cost, compared to what predicted.
Let M = {1, . . . ,M} be a set of agents, where j ∈ M
is constrained to select xj ∈ X j . Denote X
.
= X 1 × · · · ×
XM . The cost incurred by agent j ∈ M is described by the
function Jj(xj , x−j ; δ) : X × ∆ → R. Since Jj depends
both on the decision of the agents, and on the realization of
δ ∈ ∆, the notion of Nash equilibrium is devoid of meaning.
Instead, [14], [31] propose the notion of robust equilibrium
as a robustification of the former.11 While a description of
the uncertainty set ∆ is seldom available, agents have often
access to past realizations {δi}Ni=1, which we assume to be
independent samples from (∆,F ,P). It is therefore natural to
consider the “sampled” counterpart of a robust equilibrium.
Definition 6 (Sampled robust equilibrium). Given sam-
ples {δi}Ni=1, a tuple xSR is a sampled robust equilib-
rium if xSR ∈ X and maxi∈{1,...,N} J
j(xjSR, x
−j
SR; δi) ≤
maxi∈{1,...,N} J
j(xj , x−jSR; δi), ∀x
j ∈ X j , ∀j ∈ M.
Observe that xSR can be thought of as a Nash equilibrium
with respect to the worst-case cost functions
Jjmax(x)
.
= max
i∈{1,...,N}
Jj(x; δi). (9)
In parallel to what discussed in Section IV-A, the uncertainty
should be regarded as shared amongts the agents. In this
context, we are interested in bounding the probability that a
given agent j ∈ M will incur a higher cost, compared to
what predicted by the empirical worst case Jjmax(xSR).
Definition 7 (Agent’s risk). The risk incurred by agent j ∈
M at the given x ∈ X is
V j(x) = P
{
δ ∈ ∆ s.t. Jj(x; δ) ≥ Jjmax(x)
}
In addition to existence and uniqueness results, the following
corollary provides a bound on such risk measure.
Corollary 2 (Probabilistic feasibility for xSR). Assume that,
for all j ∈ M, the cost function Jj is continuously differen-
tiable, as well as convex in xj for fixed x−j and δ. Assume
that the sets {X j}Mj=1 are non-empty, closed, convex.
- Then, a sampled robust equilibrium exists.
- Further assume that, for all tuples (δ1, . . . , δN ), and N ,
F (x)
.
=


∂x1J
1
max(x)
...
∂xMJ
M
max(x)

 (10)
is strongly monotone.12 Then xSR is unique.
11A feasible tuple xR is a robust equilibrium if ∀j ∈ M, ∀xj ∈ X j , it
is maxδ∈∆ J
j(xj
R
, x
−j
R
; δ) ≤ maxδ∈∆ J
j(xj , x−j
R
; δ), see [14], [31].
12∂xjJ
j
max(x) denotes the subgradient of J
j
max with respect to x
j ,
computed at x. While the operator F (x) is now set valued, the definition
of strong monotonicity given in footnote 6 can be easily generalized, [32].
- Fix β ∈ (0, 1). Let ε(k) = 1 − t(k), k ∈ N, with
t : N→ R as in Definition 3. In addition to the previous
assumptions, assume that xSR coincides P
N almost-
surely with the robust sampled equilibrium of a game
obtained by eliminating all the constraints that are not
of support. Then, for any agent j ∈M, any ∆, P
P
N [V j(xSR) ≤ ε(s
⋆)] ≥ 1− β,
P
N [V j(xSR) ≤ ε(n+M)] ≥ 1− β,
(11)
where s⋆ is the number support constraints of xSR.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 2 ensures that, for any given agent j ∈ M,
the probability of incurring a higher cost than Jjmax(xSR) is
bounded by ε(s⋆), with high confidence.
V. AN APPLICATION TO DEMAND-RESPONSE MARKETS
In this section, we consider a demand response scheme
where electricity scheduling happens 24-hours ahead of time,
agents are risk-averse and self-interested. Formally, given
a population of agents M = {1, . . . ,M}, agent j ∈ M
is interested in the purchase of xjt electricity-units at the
discrete time t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, through a demand-response
scheme. Agent j ∈ M is constrained in his choice to xj ∈
X j ⊆ RT≥0 convex, as dictated by its energy requirements.
Let σ(x) =
∑n
j=1 x
j be the total consumption profile.
Given an inflexible demand profile d = [d1, . . . , dT ] ∈ RT≥0
corresponding to the non-shiftable loads, the cost incurred
by each agent j is given by its total electricity bill
Jj(xj , σ(x);d) =
T∑
t=1
(αtσt(x) + βtdt)x
j
t , (12)
where we have assumed that, at time t, the unit-price of elec-
tricity ctσt(x) + βtdt is a sole function of the shiftable load
σt(x) and of the inflexible demand dt (with αt, βt > 0), in
the same spirit of [33], [34]. In a realistic set-up, each agent
has access to a history of previous profiles {di}
N
i=1 (playing
the role of {δi}Ni=1), which we assume to be independent
samples from the probability space (∆,F ,P), though P is
not known. We model the agents as self-interested and risk-
averse, so that the notion of sampled robust equilibrium
introduced in Definition 6 is well suited. Assumption 2 is
satisfied, while the operator F defined in (10) is strongly
monotone for every N and tuple (d1, . . . ,dN ).
13 By Corol-
lary 2, xSR exists and is unique. Additionally, under the non-
degeneracy assumption, we inherit the probabilistic bounds
(11), whose quality and relevance we aim to test in the
following numerics.
13This can be seen upon noticing that J
j
max(x) =
∑T
t=1(αtσt(x))x
j
t+
maxi∈{1,...,N}(Bdi)
⊤xj , where B = diag(β1, . . . , βT). Correspond-
ingly, the operator F is obtained as the sum of two contributions
F = F1 + F2. The operator F1 is relative to a game with costs
{
∑T
t=1(αtσt(x))x
j
t}
M
j=1, and F2 is relative to a game with costs
{maxi∈{1,...,N}(Bdi)
⊤xj}Mj=1. While F1 has been shown to be strongly
monotone in [3, Lem 3.], F2 is monotone as it is obtained stack-
ing one after the other the subdifferentials of the convex functions
{maxi∈{1,...,N}(Bdi)
⊤xj}Mj=1. Thus, F is strongly monotone.
We use California’s winter daily consumption profiles
(available at [35]), as samples of the inflexible demand
{di}Ni=1, on top of which we imagine to deploy the demand-
response scheme. In order to verify the quality of our bounds
- and only for that reason - we fit a multidimensional
Gaussian distribution N (µ,Σ) to the data. Figure 2 displays
100 samples from the dataset [35] (left), and 100 synthetic
samples from the multidimensional Gaussian model (right).
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Fig. 2. Left: data samples from [35]. Right: synthetic samples ∼ N (µ,Σ).
We assume that the agents’ constraint sets are given by
X j = {xj ∈ R24≥0, s.t.
∑24
t=1 x
j
t ≥ γ
j}, where γj is
randomly generated according to a truncated gaussian dis-
tribution with mean 480, standard deviation 120 and 400 ≤
γj ≤ 560, all in MWh. We set αt = βt = 500$/MWh
2,
and consider M = 100 agents representing, for example,
electricity aggregators. We limit ourselves to N = 500
samples (i.e. a history of 500 days) to make the example
realistic. Since n +M = 2500, the a-priori bound in (11)
is not useful. On the other hand, the values of s⋆ observed
after extracting {di}Ni=1 from N (µ,Σ) and computing the
solution xSR, are in the range 3 ≤ s⋆ ≤ 7. Considering the
specific instance with s⋆ = 7, and setting β = 10−6, the a-
posteriori bound in (11) gives V j(xSR) ≤ ε(7) = 6.49%
for all agents, with a confidence of 0.999999. Since the
cost Jj(xj , σ(x);d) is linear in d, and d ∼ N (µ,Σ), it
is possible to compute the risk at the solution V j(xSR) in
closed form, for each j ∈ M. This calculation reveals that
the highest risk over all the agents is 0.16% ≤ 6.49% = ε(7),
in accordance to Corollary 2 (the lowest value is 0.11%).
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Fig. 3. Left: cost distribution for the agent with the highest risk. Right:
sum of average inflexible demand µ = E[d], and flexible demand σ(xSR).
Figure 3 (left) shows the distributions of the cost for the
agent with the highest risk. Figure 3 (right) shows the
sum of the average inflexible demand µ, and the flexible
demand σ(xSR). The difference between ε(7) = 6.49% and
0.11% ≤ V j(xSR) ≤ 0.16%, j ∈M is partly motivated, by
the request that the bound V j(xSR) ≤ ε(7) = 6.49% holds
true for very high confidence 0.999999. While an additional
source of conservativism might be ascribed, at first sight, to
having used V (xSR) ≤ ε(s⋆) to derive V j(xSR) ≤ ε(s⋆)
(see the proof of Corollary 2 in Appendix), this is not the
case relative to the setup under consideration. Indeed, Monte
Carlo simulations show that V (xSR) ≈ 0.17%, comparably
with V j(xSR). In other words, a realization that renders xSR
unfeasible for agent j is also likely to make xSR unfeasible
for agent l 6= j.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this manuscript, we aimed at unleashing the power
of the scenario approach to the rich class of problems
described by variational and quasi variational inequalities.
As fundamental contribution, we provided a-priori and a-
posteriori bounds on the probability that the solution of
(1) or (6) remains feasible against unseen realizations. We
then showed how to leverage these results in the context
of uncertain game theory. While this work paves the way
for the application of the scenario approach to a broader
class of real-world applications, it also generates novel and
unexplored research questions. An example that warrants
further attention is that of tightly bounding the risk incurred
by individual players, when taking data-driven decisions in
multi-agent systems.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. The proof of point (i) in Theorem 1 follows the same
lines as the proof of [21, Thm. 4] and we here indicate which
modifications are needed in the present context.
In particular, the result in [21, Thm. 4] is similar to
that presented here in point (i) of Theorem 1, except that
the former refers to an optimization program (see equation
(30) in [21]) rather than to a variational inequality. More in
details, the proof of [21, Thm. 4] follows from that of [21,
Thm. 2 and 3]. Both [21, Thm. 2 and 3] hinge upon the
result in [21, Thm. 1]. Since all these links survive without
any modifications in the present context of VI, any difference
must be traced back to the proof of [21, Thm. 1].
Turning to the proof of this latter theorem, one sees that it
is centered around showing the following fundamental result
P
N{V (x⋆) ≥ ε(s⋆)} =
n∑
k=0
(
N
k
)∫
(ε(k),1]
(1−v)N−kdFk(v),
(13)
where Fk(v) is the probability that the tuple (δ1, . . . , δk)
corresponds to constraints {Xδi}
k
i=1 that are all of support
and V (x⋆k) ≤ v, where x
⋆
k denotes the solution obtained from
{Xδi}
k
i=1. This result is originally proven by showing that
two events (indicated with A and B in the proof of [21, Thm.
1]) coincide up to a zero probability set. To this purpose, one
uses the fact that the solution x⋆k is feasible for all constraints
(a fact that remains valid in our present context when the
solution of a VI problem is considered that only contains
the first k constraints), and that the support constraints alone
return with probability 1 the same solution that is obtained
with all constraints (the so-called non degeneracy condition,
which is also valid in the context of the VI problem owing
to Assumption 1). Thus, the proof that A = B almost-surely,
as presented in [21], does not directly use the fact that x⋆k is
the solution of an optimization program. Instead, it only uses
conditions that hold true also in the present context. Hence,
the conclusion extends to the class of variational inequalities.
After having shown that A = B up to a zero probability
set, the result in (13) follows using exactly the same argu-
ment as that used in [21]. The rest of the proof goes through
unaltered in the VI context as in [21, Thm. 1].
Consider now point (ii). We prove that s⋆ ≤ n, from which
the result follows from point (i) of the theorem because the
function ε(k) is increasing (see [21]). To show that s⋆ ≤ n,
let c = F (x⋆), where x⋆ is the unique solution to (1), and
consider the following optimization problem:
min c⊤x
s.t.: x ∈
N⋂
i=1
Xδi .
Clearly, x⋆ coincides with the solution of (14), see for exam-
ple [1, Eq. 1.3.6]. Since [15] shows that problem (14) has at
most n support constraints, in the following we prove that the
support constraints for (1) are contained among the support
constraints of (14), from which the result follows. Towards
this goal, let us consider a constraint that is not support for
(14). If we remove such constraint, the solution of (14) does
not change, which implies that cTx ≥ cTx⋆, ∀x ∈ X˜ , where
X˜ is the intersection of all constraints but the removed one;
this relation is the same as F (x⋆)T (x − x⋆) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X˜ ,
showing that x⋆ remains the solution of (1), so that the
removed constraint is not of support for (1).14 Thus, the set
of support constraints of (1) is contained in that of (14).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. The necessary and sufficient condition presented in
[1, Prop. 1.4.2] for xNE to be a Nash equilibrium coincides
with (1) where F and X are given in (8), upon noticing that
X
1
× · · · × X
M
=
(
N⋂
i=1
X
1
δi
)
×
(
N⋂
i=1
X
2
δi
)
× · · · ×
(
N⋂
i=1
X
M
δi
)
=
N⋂
i=1
(
X
1
δi
× · · · × X
M
δi
)
=
N⋂
i=1
Xδi = X .
14Notice that, differently from problem (14) where the gradient of the cost
function is fixed, F (x) depends on x so that removal of a constraint which
is not active at x⋆ may in principle enlarge the domain and make feasible
a point for which a new x¯⋆ is such that F (x¯⋆)T (x − x¯⋆) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ X˜ .
This circumstance, however, is ruled out by the uniqueness requirement in
the Standing Assumption.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof. First claim: thanks to Proposition 2, xNE is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if it solves (1) with F and X
defined as in (8). The result follows by applying the existence
result of Proposition 1 to the above mentioned variational
inequality. Second claim: The result follows thanks to the
uniqueness result of Proposition 1 applied to (1). Third claim:
this is a direct application of Theorem 1.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
Proof. Before proceeding with the proof, we recall that xSR
can be regarded as a Nash equilibrium with respect to the
costs {Jjmax}
M
j=1 defined in (9). Thus, in the following we
will prove the required statement in relation to xSR a Nash
equilibrium of the game with agents’s setM, constraint sets
{X j}Mj=1, and utilities {J
j
max}
M
j=1.
First claim: For each fixed j ∈M, Jjmax is continuous in
x, and convex in xj for fixed x−j , since it is the maximum
of a list of functions that are continuous in x and convex in
xj . Additionally, each set in {X j}Mj=1 is non-empty closed
convex. Hence, the claim follows by a direct application of
the existence result of Debreu, Glicksber, Fan [36, Thm. 1.2].
Second claim: In parallel to the result of Proposition 2,
it is not difficult to prove that, under the given assumptions,
xSR is a sampled robust equilibrium if and only if it satisfies
the variational inequality F (xSR)
⊤(x − xSR) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈
X 1× ...×XM , where F is given in (10). This can be shown
by extending the result of [1, Prop. 1.4.2] to the case of
subdifferentiable functions {Jjmax}
M
j=1, using for example
the non-smooth minimum principle of [37, Thm. 2.1.1].
Uniqueness is then guaranteed by the strong monotonicity
of the operator F , see [37, Prop. 2.1.5].
Third claim: in order to show the desired result, we will
use an epigraphic reformulation of each agent’s optimization
problem. For ease of presentation, we show the result with
X j = Rm, but the extension is immediate.
By definition, xSR is a sampled robust equilibrium
if and only if, for each j ∈ M, it holds xjSR ∈
argminxj J
j
max(x
j , x−jSR). The latter condition is equivalent
to requiring the existence of tSR = (t
1
SR, . . . , t
M
SR) ∈ R
M s.t.
(xjSR, t
j
SR) ∈ argmin
(xj ,tj)
tj
s.t. tj ≥ Jj(xj , x−jSR; δi) ∀δi ∈ ∆
(14)
for all j ∈ M, where we have used an epigraphic reformu-
lation of the original problem, and the definition of Jjmax.
Equation (14) can be interpreted as the generalized Nash
equilibrium condition for a game with M agents, decision
variables yj = (xj , tj), and cost functions {tj}Mj=1, where
each agent j ∈M is given the feasible set
Yj(y−j) =
N⋂
i=1
Yjδi(y
−j),
Yjδi(y
−j)
.
= {(xj , tj) s.t. Jj(xj , x−j ; δi)− tj ≤ 0},
see [38, Eq. 1]. Observe that the cost functions {tj}Mj=1
are smooth and convex, while each set Yj(y−j) is closed
convex, for fixed y−j due to the convexity assumptions
on Jj(xj , x−j ; δ). Thanks to [38, Thm. 2], (xSR, tSR) is
equivalently characterized as the solution of a quasi vari-
ational inequality of the form (6) in the augmented space
y = (x, t) ∈ Rn+M , where
F (y) = 1M ⊗
[
0m
1
]
,
Y = Y1(y−1)× · · · × YM (y−M )
=
N⋂
i=1
(
Y1δi(y
−1)× · · · × YMδi (y
−M )
)
=
N⋂
i=1
Yδi(y) .
Since the latter QVI fully characterizes ySR = (xSR, tSR),
and since ySR is unique (because xSR is so), the solution
to the latter QVI must be unique. Thus, Theorem 2 applies,
and we get
P
N [V (ySR) ≤ ε(s
⋆)] ≥ 1− β with ε(s⋆)
.
= 1− t(s⋆),
where s⋆ is the number of support constraints of the QVI.
Thanks to Definition 4 and to the fact that tjSR = J
j
max(xSR),
it is possible to express V (ySR) as
V (ySR) = P{δ ∈ ∆ s.t. J
j(xSR; δ) ≥ J
j
max(xSR) for some j} .
Thanks to Definition 7, it must be V j(xSR) ≤ V (ySR) from
which the claim follows.
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